
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			13 August 1984	
MEMORANDUM	FOR NATIONAL FOREIG	N INTELLIGENCE BOARD	PRINCIPALS	
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SUBJECT:		e One Hundred and Fift 1, 27 July 1984, 1415-		
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Summary of	Decisions			¥
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Mr. Montgomery suggested that one should look more closely at what the Soviets are doing with West Europeans as a counterweight to the United States. From the Soviet point of view, they are probably both encouraged and discouraged at recent developments in the FPD, SPD, and the Greens.	25 X 1
Lt Gen Lincoln Faurer, D/NSA, wished more attention paid to Soviet attitudes toward the US elections. He said that there was insufficient discussion as to whether the Soviets would most likely conduct themselves to extract concessions from an Administration made vulnerable by the election or do something to prevent the election of President Reagan.	
The DCI said that undoubtedly the Soviets would do something if they could.	25X1
Mr. Gates said that the Soviets do think that circumstances in the United States have changed unpleasantly for them; they wish to defeat President Reagan without "having everything blow up in their faces."	25 X 1
The DCI agreed with Mr. Ermarth that the Soviets are trying to "play it both ways" in the space talks. There was general agreement with Mr. Gates' assertion that Soviet short-and long-term objectives need not be incompatible and that another four years of a Reagan administration, although not palatable, would not be a drastic setback for the Soviets.	25X1
Mr. Edward Aldridge, Under Secretary of the Air Force, said that the Soviets have a strong incentive for reaching an agreement in an area in which the US has a commanding lead.	- 25 X 1
The draft SNIE will be reviwed to incorporate the suggestions made by the principals.	25X1 25X1

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Those Participating

Mr. William J. Casey, Chairman

Mr. Robert Gates, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Hugh Montgomery, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Acting for Director,

Defense Intelligence Agency

Lieutenant General Lincoln D. Faurer, U.S. Air Force, Director, National Security Agency

Mr. Edward C. Aldridge, Jr., Under Secretary of the Air Force

Mr. Douglas Mulholland, Special Assistant to the Secretary (National Security), Department of the Treasury

Mr. Charles V. Boykin, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Department of Energy

Mr. Joseph Tierney, Acting for Assistant Director, Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Clarke Magruder, Acting for Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General James W. Shufelt, U,S, Army, Acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army

Brigadier General Paul H. Martin, U.S. Air Force, Acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Mr. John J. Guenther, Acting for Director of Intelligence, United States Marine Corps

Those Attending

Miss Eloise R. Page, Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

Mr. Herbert Meyer, Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Mr. David Gries, NIO for East Asia

Mr. Milton Kovner, NIO for Western Europe

Mr. Monty Rogers, NIO for Africa

Mr. David Low, NIO at Large

Mr. Fritz Ermarth, NIO for USSR

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